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SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF CORPORATIONS
Peter Nobel*
I
"SocIA

RESPONSIBILTY" AS AN I-imRENr PART OF THE
THEORY OF CORPORATIONS

This Article contains a review of the social responsibility of corporations from a European perspective. My preconceived idea of the
conflict between U.S. shareholder primacy versus European stakeholder approaches was very much shaken by my further analysis. In
fact, with respect to social responsibility, I see more similarities than
differences between the two approaches. However, one important difference-the fact that American equity culture is much more developed than that of Europe-explains why the two corporate theories
do not treat the issue of social responsibility in a starkly contrasting
manner.
One cannot easily categorize a European theme of corporate social responsibility because, except in England, the subject is rarely discussed under that heading.' In various countries, however, there is a
growing movement toward improved business ethics which may not
2
always be easily differentiated from "social responsibility." My treatment of social responsibility focuses on structural corporate law issues
rather than on management undertaking "good social behavior" toward third parties. Occasionally, however, I view matters from the
other side of the same coin for, "whatever the fine points of argument
about the appropriateness of expecting moral responsibility from the
legal entities we call corporations, it is certain that moral responsibility
will be ascribed to them by those affected by their operations .... 3
In most European countries the issue of social responsibility of
collective entities such as corporations must be distilled primarily
from a broad examination of the theory of corporate legal persons
* Professor, University of St. Gallen; Member of the Swiss Federal Banking
Commission.

I

See generally Is THE GOOD CORPORATION DEAD?: SOCIAL RESPONSBILIY IN A GLOBAL

ECONOMY (John W. Houck & Oliver F. Williams eds., 1996) (collecting a series of essays on
corporate responsibility). Another very noteworthy study is that ofJ.E. PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWER AND RESPONSIBILIY (1993). Parkinson stresses the importance of finding improved methods of corporate governance. See id. at 1-2.
2 See, e.g., BusINEss ETHics: A EUROPEAN APPROACH (Brian Harvey ed., 1994) [hereinafter BusINEss ETHICs] (collecting works of authors from various European countries and
discussing several themes of corporate governance).
3 Brian Harvey, Introduction to BusINEss ETHICS, supra note 2, at 5-6.
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rather than from a behavioral perspective. This stance does not mean
that corporations are invited to be freely charitable with other people's money, but rather establishes obligations to maintain a comprehensive approach to questions of social responsibility and balance
continuously competing interests. In this context, a "traditional" discussion would not encompass or support Milton Friedman's statement
'4
that "[t] he social responsibility of business is to increase its profits
because in such a discussion issues of social responsibility are not considered to be a "fundamentally subversive doctrine."5 In a traditional
discussion, a social theme is a constructive part of the corporation.
By contrast, one must consider a modem European discussion of
the topic of social responsibility within the framework of the larger
discussion of corporate governance. 6 Many Europeans do not readily
comprehend the term, but do view the firm as a whole. The main
social theme in Europe is worker co-determination, as opposed to the
American approach that relies on semipolitical shareholder activism
7
to promote business ethics on a worldwide scale.
The impact of multinational corporations on developing countries also has left its mark on the European academic scene,8 but the
subject reached its political peak some time ago when the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development ("OECD") cared
deeply about this issue. 9 Today, the multinational corporation seems
to be a well-accepted part of the global economy.
I will now explain the various themes of my short contribution.
4 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is To Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine), at 32.
5 Harvey, supra note 3, at 3 (quoting Milton Friedman) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
6 See COMPHAATxvE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds.,
1997); COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING RE-

SEARCH (MuausJ. Hopt et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter THE STATE OF THE ART]; Symposium,
Cross-BorderViews of Corporate Governance, 1998 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1; Peter Nobel, Corporate
Governance-M6glichkeiten und Schranken gesellschaftsrechtlicherGestaltung, 12 DER SCHWEIZER
TREUHANDER 1057 (1995).
7 See Harvey, supra note 3, at 8-9.
8

See HANS-GEORG KOPPENSTEINER, INTERNATIONALE UNTERNEHMEN IM DEUTSCHEN

John Dunning & Peter Robson eds., 1988) (collection of shorter works); MULTINATIONALS AND
WORT TRADE (Mark Casson et al. eds., 1986) (collection of shorter works); MULTINATIONALS IN THE NEW EUROPE AND GLOBAL TRADE (Michael W. Klein & Paul J. J. Welfens eds.,
1992) (collection of shorter works); THE RISE OF MULTINATIONALS IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE
(Geoffrey Jones & Harm G. Schr6ter eds., 1993) (collection of shorter works); STEPHEN
GESELLSCHAFrSRECHT (1971); MULTINATIONALS AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

YOUNG ET AL., FOREIGN MULTINATIONALS AND THE BrTISH ECONOMY (1988).
9
See BUSINESS SECTOR ADVISORY GROUP ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ORGANIZATION
FOR ECON. Co-OPERATION AND DEv., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: IMPROVING COMPETITIVENESS
AND ACCESS TO CAPITAL IN GLOBAL MARKETs--A REPORT TO THE OECD (1998) [hereinafter
IMPROVING COMPETITIVENESS].
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II
LESSONS FROM HISTORY

The history of corporate law contains plentiful evidence that society always has linked permission to create a corporate, and therefore
separate, legal personality to the achievement of its social goals. Corporations are in this sense social persons. 10
I will not dwell on the private Roman corporations used for tax
collection (publicant)" or the chartered colonial enterprises (like the
East India Company), 12 but up until the 19th century, the establishment of a corporate body required a state concession as a sign of public interest.' 3 The Supreme Court of New Jersey, struggling with a
corporate gift to Princeton University, held (luckily) "that just as the
conditions prevailing when corporations were originally created required that they serve public as well as private interests, modem conditions require that corporations acknowledge and discharge social as
well as private responsibilities as members of the communities within
4
which they operate."'
Today, although the selection of corporate objects is unrestricted,
nations still regulate many corporate activities and thereby maintain
the "legislative" linking of corporate activity to social goals. For example, Europeans are currently discussing the issues of corporate social
responsibility with regard to banks. This concern abounds for two reasons. First, the systemic risks of banking are substantial. Second,
there is a fear of a "credit crunch." In Europe, providing credit is
considered to be a social obligation.' 5 The American history of banking regulation provides another example of social mistrust of (too)
powerful organizations.
10

See GEORG BESELER, SYSTEM DES GEMEINDEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHTS 1052 (1885); Jo-

HANN CASPAR BLUNTSCHLI, DEUTSCHES PRIVATRECHT 69 (3d ed. 1864).
11 See ERNST BAmAN, Z6LLNER UND SONDER 85 (1997); F. Fick, Ober Begfiff und Geschichte der Aktiengesellschafjen, ZErrSCHRIET FOR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT uND KONKURsREcHT (ZHR) 27 (1862).
12 See FERNAND BRAUDEL, DER HANDEL SOZ1ALGESCHICHTE DES 15-18. JAHRHUNDERTS
491 (1986) (volume II of the multivolume work); KARL LEHMANN, DIE GESCHICHTLCHE
ENTWICKLUNG DES AKTIENRECHTS BIS ZUM CODE DE COMMERCE 37

(1895).

13 See 1 KARL LEHMANN, DAs RECHT DER AKTIENGSELLSCHAFrEN 68 (1898); see, e.g., C.
COM. art. 37 (1807) (Fr.) ("La socit6 anonyme ne peut exister qu'avec l'autorisation du
gouvernement, et avec son approbation pour l'acte qui la continue; cette approbation doit
tre donne dans la forme prescite pour les r~glements d'administration." (This statement
translates as: The anonymous society is only able to exist with the authorization of the
government, and with the approval of the act which continues it; this approval must be
given in the precise form for the rules of administration.)).
14 A-P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 586 (N.J. 1953).
15
SeeJORGEN MOLLER & INGO VOGELSANG, STAATLIcHE REGULIERUNG: REGULATED INDUSTRIES IN DEN USA uM

GEMEINWOHLBINDUNG

IN WETBEWERBUCHEN AUSNAHMEBER-

DEUTSCHLAND (1979); PErER NOBEL, SCHWEIZERISCHES
FrNANzMARKTREcHT §§ 4, 7 (1997); Friedrich Schneider, Regulating the Banking Sector
(1990) (unpublished dissertation, Florenz) (on file with author).
EICHEN IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK
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In many countries, the state also uses the corporate form to organize state-ran activities, public companies such as utilities, and
mixed companies. 16 In various European countries, Italy and France
in particular, the state imposes corporate structures on banks and important sectors of industry. France often views the corporation as an
instrument of economic policy. Nonetheless, one should note that
Europe has witnessed a major wave of privatisations and public sector
17
restructurings in recent years.
European corporate legal theorists tend to view the corporation
as a social reality rather than a mere legal fiction. In Continental Europe, mainly Germany, diverging opinions about the nature of the
corporate entity led to a "scientific" battle in the nineteenth century,' 8
which the "realistic" approach appears to have won. This approach
views corporations as part of the social organization and as a social
institution, not simply an institution that stems from the embarrassment of the economic theory of law that one cannot make contracts
perfectly. 19
The general European approach, which could be termed the "social" approach, identifies directors as inherent parts of the corporate
body--as its organs-and not simply as inherently untrustworthy
agents whom one must closely control to prevent them from stealing
or taking unreasonable risks with investors' money. The social approach does not raise, in theory or in practice, major agency issues.
This failure might be due to the fact that the corporation itself is seen
as having a value that directors are inclined to serve properly.
Similarly, European legislators and courts view the statutory objects of a corporation in a broad manner. Even the English abandoned the doctrine of "ultra vires" in the course of the European
16

See Symposium, supra note 6. In particular, see James A. Fanto, The Role of Corporate

Law in the Adaptation ofFrenchEnterprises, 1998 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 97; Jonathan R. Macey,

Italian Corporate Governance: One American's Perspective 1998 COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 121; Olivier Pastr, Corporate Governance: The End of "L'ExceptionFranaise"?,1998 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 79.
17

EDOUARD CorNTRAu & FERNANDO WASsNER, PRIVATISIERUNG:

ALTERNATIVEN ZUR

STAATSWIRTSCHAFr (1987); COUNCIL OF EUROPE, PRIVATISATION OF PUBLIC UNDERTAINGS
AND AcTrvrriEs: RECOMMENDATION No. R (93) 7 AND EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM (recom-

mendation adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on October
18, 1993); INTERNATIONAL PRIVATISATION (Thomas Clarke ed., 1994) (collection of shorter
works); Ls PRIVATISATIONS EN FRANCE, EN ALLEMAGNE, EN GRANDE-BRETAGNE ET EN ITALIE

(Fabrice Dion ed., 1995); ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, STATE-OWNED ENTERPRIsEs AND PRIVATISATION (1998); RECHTL]CHE PROBLEME
DER PRVATISIERUNG, BERNER TAGE FOR JuRST*sCHE PRAYus (1997) (collecting a variety of

contributions about the situations in Switzerland and Germany).
18

See 1-9

OrO VON GiERKE, DAS DEUTSCHE GENOSSENSCHAFrSRECHT

(1954);

OrrO VON

GIERKE, NATURRECHT UND DEUTSCHEs REcHT (1883); OrO VON GIERKE, Handelsgesellschaft
und birgerlichesRech4 in 19 ARCHIV FUR BURGERLICHES REc:-r 144 (1901).
19 See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRuGTURE (1995).
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Company Law harmonization (First Directive of 1968, Article 9).20
This change provides corporations with more independence.
An examination of the tenets of Private International Law concerning the determination of the nationality of a corporation reveals
an interesting divergence among European nations. While countries
like England and Switzerland adopt the same theory of incorporation 21 that the United States uses, Germany, France, and others still
subscribe to the theory that a corporation's nationality should be the
law of the place where the main decisions of the corporation are
made. The managers bear the social responsibilities prevailing at the
place of their main decisions.2 2 The European community has yet to
settle this important divergence. One also may see this difference as
evidence that, under German and French law, a corporation is not a
mere "paper tiger," a product of convenience (or inconvenience), but
is rather part of and acting within a social reality.
The corporation is the dominant structure for assembling capital
and for organizing governance structures to run a business. At certain
times in this century, however, people largely disregarded those purposes and concentrated on the business itself. In Germany, people
developed corporations under the theory of the "Business by itself'
("Unternehmen an sich") and paid only lip service to the function of
efficient capital allocation. Many viewed each business as part of the
23
national economy, fully engaged for the "social product."
In the 1970s and 1980s, theorists, again mainly in Germany, dedicated themselves to a wider discussion of the organization of a business enterprise in which stakeholders participate in various activities.
The debate recognized the workers as the principal stakeholders, but
did not forget the interests of the community at large. The parties to
this debate directed the main thrust of the discussion toward integrating a wider spectrum of "interests" (the so called "Unternehmensrecht')
into the legal organization of corporations. This discussion, however,
resulted only in the consolidation of employees' co-determination
rights. Whether co-determination is a social advantage or a hindrance
to employees at this stage, especially in the context of corporate
restructurings in Germany, remains unresolved. This debate has just
begun.

See MARcus

21

LUTrER, EUROPAISCHES UNTERNEHMENSRECHT 101 (4th ed. 1996).
See PETFR FORSTMOSER ET AL., ScWEIzElusciHES AETIENRECHT 70 (1996).

22

See Frank Vischer, Gesellschaftsrech4 in IPRG KoMmm:rmNT

20

Komm:rNTAR

ZUM

BUNDESGESETz OBER DAS INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT (IPRG) VOM 1 JANUAR 1989 art. 154,

at 1341 (Anton Heini et al. eds., 1993).
23

See ARNDT RiEcHERs, DAs UNTERNEHMEN AN sicI: DIE EN-WICKLUNG ENES BEGRIFFES

IN DER AmENRECHTSDISKUSSION DES 20. JH. (1996).
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III
WHAT ARE DIRECTORs ALLOWED

To Do?

Directors must run the business of the corporation with due care.
In Europe, we do not use "Revlon," 24 but instead use comparable cosmetics. In the company laws of European countries, the role of the
board (or, in the German dualistic system, of the "Aufsichtsra') has
become a major issue in legislative matters, case law, and legal and
business discussion.2 5 Fulfillment of the obligations envisioned by the
law alone did not seem satisfactory to many critics, 26 and various corporate failures intensified the debate. 27 As a result, European countries widely have increased and standardized the accounting standards
and disclosure requirements through such measures as LAS and USGAAP. 28
Theorists rarely discuss the extent that social goals play a role in
corporate thought. However, a consensus seems to exist that a corporation must consider the interests of all stakeholders (and not simply
shareholders) .29 The courts often concentrate on the "interest of the
corporation" and apply an integrated and wide balance-of-interests
test.30 Therefore, under a long-term view, even profit maximizing
might demand that a corporation consider an optimal combination of
all contributing factors.
To what extent social actions are legal, however, is not easy to say.
After extensive research, the English author Parkinson comes to the
following conclusion, which remains valid today:
[T]he legal model will in practice accommodate a measure of
profit-sacrificing responsibility notwithstanding the duty of management to maximize profits, given that the strict enforcement of that
duty is not feasible. It is likely as a result... that the law will rarely
present an obstacle to the limited social-policy objectives that companies currently espouse, and that in fact there is room for companies to take their activities considerably further before the legal
31
controls begin to pose a serious threat.
24

See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).

25

See IMPROVING COMPETITIVENESS,

supra note

9;

REPORT OF THE COMMTTrrE

ON THE

FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CoR'ORATE GOVERNANCE (THE CADBURY REPORT) 20-35 (1992) [hereinafter THE CADBURY REPORT] (report named after the president of the committee, Adrian

Cadbury).
supra note 6, at 227.
See THE CADBURY REPORT, supra note 25,
2.1-2.2, at 14.
28 See FoRSTMOSER ET AL., supra note 21, at 710-12.
29 See IMPROVING COMPETrrIVENESS, supra note 9, at 61-66.
30 E.g., Swiss Federal Court Decision, BGE 117 11 312, BGE 102 II 267, BGE 95 II 162,
BGE 93 II 406, BGE 91 II 300, BGE 69 II 248.
31 PARKINSON, supra note 1, at 279-80.
26
27

See THE STATE OF THE ART,
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A recent study by Eddy Wymeersch gives some further clues on the
limits of "corporate necessities" 3 2 and reveals a great deal of disagreement regarding what actions are within the legitimate power of
directors:
[O]ne could conclude that with respect to the question of to what
extent boards of European companies are considered to serve the
interests of the shareholders, the European legal systems offer a variety of answers. The most shareholder-minded systems are the British, the Swiss and the Belgian, which limit attention for nonshareholder interests to long-term strategies aimed at ultimately
protecting the wealth of the shareholders. In the other systems,
there are different tendencies: some opt for a balancing of interests,
primarily of capital and labor; some extend it to other stakeholders;
and others see the ultimate continuity of the firm as the primary
assignment of the board, an opinion which comes close to defending the interests of the firm "as such". The practical effects of this
analysis also differ: although judges everywhere are very loath to interfere-in fact they almost never do-with the business decisions,
remedies are granted on the basis of violations of procedural rules,
informational imbalances or the refusal to take into consideration
one of the classes of stakeholders. Review on the merits seems to be
33
extremely rare.
Therefore, a clear consensus among European scholars does not exist.
It may be that corporations will have to sacrifice "some" profits for
social reasons.
What is needed is mechanisms [sic] that will secure the efficient
operation of the business, but which will not at the same time
render management impervious to considerations other than maximum profits. Unless managers operate in a disciplinary framework
that allows them to trade off profits in favour of third-party interests,
other measures to increase responsibility are likely to have rather
34
limited results.
Europe also is witnessing not only a growing awareness of the need to
increase the flexibility of corporate reactions to a changing environment, but also a rise of increasingly different expectations amongst
investors. The analysis and discussion of corporate governance are a
key theme emerging from the major, and increasingly activist, role of
institutional investors. Many of these investors collect and manage social capital.

32 See Eddy Wymeersch, A StatusReport on CorporateGovernancein Some ContinentalEuropean States, in THE STATE OF THE ART, supra note 6, at 1086.
33

Id.

34

PARKINSON, supra note 1, at 433.
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IV
CO-DETERMINATION AS SociAL REsPONSIBIHlY?

If one examines the European Union Company Law harmonization program, it becomes clear that Europe has not yet widely accepted the German co-determination legislation, which contains clear
"social" aspects and, if implemented, would affect European Union
corporate law and takeover proposals. For this reason, both the main
directive on corporate governance, the Fifth Company Law Directive3 5
on the "structure" of corporations, and the dreamy project of a European Company (Societas Europea or S.E.) 36 have not advanced in al37
most twenty years.
The same reasons may lie, in part, behind German resistance to
mandatory takeover bid rules in the proposals for a Thirteenth directive.5 8 These opponents may believe that an active market for corporate control is too disruptive an element and raise stakeholder "rights"
as an additional defensive argument. The proposed directive provides, therefore, that the German law for groups of companies is a
sufficient alternative for protecting minority shareholders. 39 The proposal also subjects groups of companies to the rules of co-determination.40 Of course, the German co-determination system is not an
absolute obstacle to international mergers such as the DaimlerChrysler merger. German corporation law and law of co-determinadon will govern the new holding corporation, DaimlerChrysler AG,
despite its being the head of a worldwide enterprise. Therefore, workers will elect half of the supervising body (the "Aufsichtsrat'). Surprisingly, this fact did not generate a wider discussion in the literature.
1972 O.J. (C 131) 49.
See 1970 O.J. (C 124) 1.
See LurraR, supra note 20, at 171.
See id. at 281.
See 1996 O.J. (C 162) 05 (proposing a thirteenth directive of the European Parliament and of the European Council in the field of company law and takeover offers). For
German law, see § 5 Mitbestimmungsgesetz, v. 4.5.1976.
40 See Henry Peter & Francesca Birchier, Les groupes de societes sont es societes simples, 3
Swiss R. Bus. L. 113, 115-24 (1998).
Note that the law of the European Union provides for a groupwide scheme of worker
representation at the shop level, but not within the framework of corporate law. See Council
Directive 97/74, 1998 OJ. (L 010) 22-23 (extending, to the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, Council Directive 94/45, 1994 O.J. (L 254) 64, to establish a
European Works Council or a procedure in Community-scale undertakings and groups of
undertakings for the purposes of informing and consulting employees). Other rules to
protect workers also exist at the European Community level. See, e.g., Council Directive
77/187, 1977 O.J. (L 61) 26 (addressing the approximation of the laws of the member
states relating to the safeguarding of employees' rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses); Council Directive 80/987, 1980 O.J. (L 283) 23
(addressing the approximation of the laws of the member states relating to the protection
of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer).
35

36
37
38
39
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V
THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE CONCEPT AND THE OECD
REPORT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The shareholder value concept has gained acceptance in Europe,
but with some suspicion. This skepticism prevails for two reasons.
First, many perceive the shareholder value concept as an example of
looking at the horse from the wrong end-from the shareholder perspective rather than the business enterprise perspective. This perception remains even though today no one would share the views of
Ffirstenberg, a Berlin banker in the 1920s, who described shareholders as "stupid because they give money and arrogant because they
want dividends." Second, an almost universal opinion exists that the
shareholder value concept is too narrow. 4 1 Therefore, for many
Europeans, if they are to take account of the concept at all, it must be
enlarged to a broader discussion regarding stakeholders and all other
interests surrounding the corporation. Furthermore, the Berle/
Means corporation 42 did not really exist in Continental Europe when
the concept was introduced; rather, one could describe the former
European situation by reversing Mark Roe: strong owners, obedient
managers. 43
Corporate governance also has become a fascinating and "hot"
topic in Europe. The English Cadbury Report, which focused on
management accountability and "best practice" for listed companies,
began the debate in earnest in 1992. 44 This report was followed
closely by the Greenbury,4 5 Hampel 46 and French Vinot Reports, 47
among others. The corporate governance debate reached its current
climax in April 1998 with the OECD advisory group report (under the
American chairmanship of Ira Milstein). 48 The OECD Report clearly
favors the shareholder value concept, but not exclusively; instead, the
41

See DIETER FEDDERSEN

ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:

OPTIMIERUNG DER UN-

TERNEHMENSFOHRUNG UND DER UNTERNEHMENS-KONTROLLE IM DEUTSCHEN UND AMERIKANIS-

AKTIENECi-T 4-8 (1996); Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Corporate Governance: Eine
Vorbemerkung zu den Beitragen von Edward B. Rock und Eddy Wymeersch, DIE ARTIENGESELLSCHAFr (AG), Heft 7/1995, 289-90.
42 See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
CHEN

PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
43
See MARKJ. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS,

WEAK OvNERs: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMER-

icN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
44 See THE CADBURY REPORT, supra note 25.
45

See DIEcTOR's REMUNERATION: REPORT OF A STUDY GROUP (THE GREENBURY RE-

PORT) (1995).
46 See FINAL

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (THE HAMPEL

REPORT) (1998).
47

See RAPPORT: LE CONSEIL, D'ADMINISTRATION

DES SOCIETES COTEES, RAPPORT DU

GROUPE DE TRAVAIL INSTITUE PAR L'AssocIATION FRANCAISE DES ENTREPRIsES

(THE VIENOT REPORTS) (1998).
See IMPROVING COMPETrnvENESS, supra note 9.

NATIONAL DU PATRONAT FRANCAIS

48

T LE CONSEL
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advisory group seems to intend the creation of a new concept, "enter49

prise value."

The OECD Report's chapter headings illustrate this unusually
wide approach:
Chapter 2. Defining the Mission of the Corporation in the
Modem Economy...
Chapter 3. Ensuring Adaptability of Corporate Governance Arrangements...
Chapter 4. Protecting Shareholder Rights...
Chapter 5. Enabling Active Investing...
Chapter 6. Aligning the Interests of Shareholders and Other
Stakeholders...
Chapter 7. Recognising Societal Interests ....50
Note that the Report separates "Aligning the Interests of Shareholders
and Other Stakeholders" from "Recognizing Societal Interests," indicating that the authors view the two subjects as separate issues. 51
The OECD advisory group explains its views on the importance of
recognizing societal interests as follows:
Companies do not act independently from the societies in which
they operate. Accordingly, corporate actions must be compatible
with societal objectives concerning social cohesion, individual welfare and equal opportunities for all. Attending to legitimate social
concerns should, in the long run, benefit all parties, including investors. At times, however, there may be a trade-off between shortterm social costs and the long-term benefits to society of having a
healthy, competitive private sector. Societal needs that transcend
the responsive ability of the private sector should be met by specific
public policy measures, rather than by impeding improvements in
52
corporate governance and capital allocation.
The OECD Report is obviously the result of compromise among
the many states that participated in its production. 53 Thus, while the
enhancement of shareholder value increasingly becomes recognized
as the primary goal of the corporation, a noteworthy kind of "local"
perspective that integrates other contributing factors (such as the interests of stakeholders) visibly colors the result. There is no universal
theory of the corporation yet.

51

See id.
Id. at 3-4, 17-18.
Se id.

52

Id. at 18.

49
50

Participants included representatives from Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, ItalyJapan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. See id. at 93-103.
53

SOCTAL RESPONSIBIITY2
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The Report not only recognizes that attempting to improve corporate performance while at the same time seeking to satisfy societal
interests is a complex project, but also identifies six groups of issues
that may affect any corporation's efforts to accommodate societal
interests:
7.1
7.2
7.3
tures...
7.4

Corporate Trust Bases...
Potential Income and Opportunity Path Divergence...
Effective Disclosure of Contractual and Governance StrucInvestments with High Social and Low Economic Returns

7.5 Privatisation [and]

...

54
7.6 Corporate Citizenship
This list reflects not only all of the structural changes of modem corporate societies, but also the ongoing political discussion and its related stumbling blocks. The trend is, however, a global one, although
at this level systems still compete more than they actjointly. We might
allow ourselves to be confident of this trend; shareholder control has
even discovered a Vietnamese sweatshop. 5 5
CONCLUSION

In light of both the recent events affecting the world's financial
markets and the new "community" of social democratic governments
in the European Union, the question of corporate social responsibility
is not a fading issue, but rather a very topical one. However, the answer to when corporations are "good citizens" will remain complex
and disputed. In short, Europe seems to be following an increasing
trend toward social responsibility, at least to the extent that more or at
least wider aspects of the issue are being taken into consideration.
The issue of social responsibility is no longer "subversive." It has become socially acceptable. As a judge of the Court of the European
Union said recently, "My plea to you is: You must raise your eyes from
56
pure competition issues; you must also take values into account.

54

Id. at 4.

55 See Nike Shoe Plantin Vrietnam Is Called Unsafefor Workers, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 8, 1997, at
Al. For information about the Nike boycott, visit <http://www.saigon.com/-nike/

update.htn>.
56 The statement was made in the Weimar Symposium on the Competition Law of
Deregulation: The Scope for Private and Public Law & Regulation in European and International Economic Law (Oct. 16-18, 1998).

